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CARACHURI-ROSENDO V. HOLDER: 
TO BE DEEMED CONVICTED OF AN 
AGGRAVATED FELONY, AN ACTUAL 
CONVICTION IS REQUIRED 
Inna Zazulevskaya* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the immigration debate heats up around the country and the 
number of formal removals1 continues to consistently increase, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the U.S. government and rendered 
an important decision regarding immigration law in Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder.2 The Court held that a noncitizen, or alien, 
convicted of a simple drug-possession offense—an offense that has 
not been enhanced based on the history of a prior conviction—has 
not been convicted of an aggravated felony for immigration 
purposes.3 Thus the noncitizen will not be subject to mandatory 
deportation and may seek a discretionary form of relief from the 
removal order.4 
Starting in the late 1980s, the American public became 
increasingly concerned about and fearful of noncitizen criminals.5 
Ironically, studies indicate that the public’s concern is misguided 
given that immigrants have lower crime rates and lower incarceration 
rates than native-born U.S. citizens.6 Nonetheless, the number of 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to thank all of the editors and 
staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, as well as Professor Victor Nieblas Pradis for 
all his help.   
 1. When a noncitizen is “removed” it means he is deported from the country. This 
Comment uses the terms “removal” and “deportation” interchangeably. 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 2589. 
 4. See infra note 25 and accompanying text; infra Part IV. 
 5. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 550 (5th ed. 2009). 
 6. Natalie Liem, Mean What You Say, Say What You Mean: Defining the Aggravated-
Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More Than Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1071, 
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formal removals has been on the rise: over 392,000 noncitizens—the 
highest number in U.S. history in a given year—were removed in 
2010.7 More than 195,000 of the noncitizens removed in 2010 were 
removed on criminal grounds.8 
The high number of noncitizens removed on criminal grounds is 
not surprising given that noncitizens may be deported for convictions 
of even minor criminal offenses. For example, like the appellant in 
Carachuri-Rosendo, a noncitizen may be deported for possessing 
one pill of Xanax9 without a prescription.10 Although the appellant 
was deported based on this simple-possession offense, he did not 
challenge the ease with which noncitizens lawfully present in the 
country may be removed. Instead, the appellant challenged the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding that noncitizen’s subsequent simple-possession 
conviction was an aggravated felony, solely because it could have 
been prosecuted as an aggravated felony under federal law—even 
though it was not actually prosecuted as such.11 The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the noncitizen appellant and held that a 
subsequent conviction for simple possession is not a conviction for 
an aggravated felony.12 This is significant because noncitizens may 
apply for a form of relief from removal if they meet the eligibility 
criteria13 and while convictions of minor criminal offenses do not 
serve as a mandatory bar to applying for relief, convictions of 
aggravated felonies always do.14 The Court’s holding means that 
noncitizens who are convicted of two or more simple-possession 
 
1092 (2007). 
 7. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, DHS/ICE Reveal Highest 
Immigration Enforcement on Record in Fiscal Year 2010, (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/ 
news/releases/1010/101008washingtondc.htm. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Xanax is a prescription drug used to treat anxiety and panic disorders. However, these 
days it is becoming widely available and is being commonly prescribed for use on an occasional 
basis to help people deal with the anxiety of flying or cope with death. Alex William, You Are 
Cleared for Takeoff, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/fashion/ 
17flying.html?pagewanted=1; see Tara Parker-Pope, For Some Bereaved, Pain Pills Without End, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2007), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/for-some-bereaved-pain-
pills-without-end/. 
 10. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2583 (2010). 
 11. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2577 
(2010). 
 12. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2590 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 13. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 240(A)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
 14. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581. 
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offenses will not be automatically barred from applying for relief 
from removal and thus have a chance of being allowed to remain in 
the country. 
This Comment examines the Court’s rationale in Carachuri-
Rosendo and discusses what might be an unintended and unfortunate 
consequence of that decision. Part II summarizes the case’s facts and 
procedural history. Part III explains the Court’s reasoning, while Part 
IV discusses the historical framework of the case. Part V examines 
the case’s impact and the significant questions left unanswered by 
the Court. Part V also analyzes how this decision may lead to further 
nonuniformity in the application of the drug-trafficking-aggravated-
felony provision and suggests how to avoid this nonuniformity. 
Finally, Part VI concludes that, although the Carachuri-Rosendo 
decision has its shortcomings, its importance should not be 
overlooked. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo (“Carachuri-Rosendo”) was born 
in Mexico in 1978.15 When he was five years old, he moved with his 
parents to the United States and has been a lawful permanent resident 
since then.16 In 2004, Carachuri-Rosendo pleaded guilty in a Texas 
court to possessing less than two ounces of marijuana, a 
misdemeanor offense, and received a twenty-day jail sentence.17 In 
2005, he pleaded no contest to possessing one tablet of Xanax 
without a prescription, also a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to ten 
days in jail.18 Texas state law, like federal law, allows a sentencing 
enhancement if the prosecutor proves to the court that the defendant 
has been previously convicted of an offense of a similar class.19 
However, the prosecutor did not to seek such an enhancement in 
Carachuri-Rosendo’s Xanax-possession case20 and did not prosecute 
him as a recidivist.21 
 
 15. Id. at 2583. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2580, 2583. 
 19. Id. at 2583. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2577 
(2010). 
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In 2006, the federal government initiated removal proceedings 
on the basis of Carachuri-Rosendo’s second conviction for Xanax 
possession.22 Appearing in front of the Immigration Judge (IJ), 
Carachuri-Rosendo conceded that his conviction for possession of 
Xanax made him removable under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA).23 But he still applied for a discretionary 
cancellation of removal pursuant to INA section 240(A)(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a).24 This section provides the attorney general with 
discretion to cancel an order removing a noncitizen if the noncitizen, 
among other things, has not been convicted of an aggravated 
felony.25 The IJ denied Carachuri-Rosendo’s petition and declared 
him ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had committed 
a drug-trafficking crime,26 which is an aggravated felony for the 
purposes of the INA.27 The IJ explained that a second misdemeanor 
possession offense committed after a prior conviction for a 
misdemeanor becomes final may be prosecuted as a felony under the 
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).28 Hence, according to the 
IJ, since Carachuri-Rosendo’s second simple-possession conviction 
could have been punished as an aggravated felony under federal law, 
he was ineligible for cancellation of removal.29 
Carachuri-Rosendo appealed the decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).30 The BIA disagreed with the IJ’s 
reasoning but upheld the ruling31 because it was bound by the Fifth 
 
 22. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583. 
 23. Id. The INA states that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State [or], the United States . . . relating to a 
controlled substance” is removable. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
 24. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583. 
 25. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). “Aggravated 
felonies” are state, federal, or foreign convictions that fit into the categories outlined in section 
101(a)(43) of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Some examples include: murder, rape, a crime of 
violence for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, and a theft offense for which 
the term of imprisonment was at least one year. Id.; see also Nelson A. Vargas-Padilla, The 
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct, 3 CRIM. L. BRIEF 24, 27–31 (2007) (discussing 
some of the statutorily designated aggravated felonies and how the courts have dealt with them). 
 26. Carachuri-Rosendo, 570 F.3d at 265. “Drug trafficking crime” is defined as a felony 
punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Id. 
 27. Id. at 264–65. 
 28. Id. at 265. 
 29. Id.; Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2583. 
 30. Carachuri-Rosendo, 570 F.3d at 265. 
 31. Id. 
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Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos.32 The BIA 
stated that, had it not been bound by the Fifth Circuit’s decision, it 
would have required that a second simple-possession offense be 
prosecuted “under a state recidivism law that corresponds to the 
federal recidivism law”33 before that second possession offense could 
qualify as an aggravated felony. This is so because, according to the 
BIA, “immigration judges should not go outside the record of the 
second conviction to determine what, hypothetically, might have 
been prosecuted.”34 
On review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision.35 The 
court reasoned that since Carachuri-Rosendo’s second offense could 
have been punished as a felony under the CSA if he had been 
prosecuted in federal court,36 he was ineligible for cancellation of 
removal because he had committed a drug-trafficking crime, which 
qualifies as an aggravated felony.37 After the Fifth Circuit rendered 
its decision, Carachuri-Rosendo was removed and petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court for certiorari.38 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because the circuit 
courts disagreed as to whether a conviction for a subsequent simple-
possession offense qualifies as an aggravated felony if the 
noncitizen’s conviction has not been enhanced based on prior 
conviction in state court (in other words, if the noncitizen has not 
been convicted as a recidivist).39 
 
 32. 412 F.3d 572, 576–77 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a second state misdemeanor 
possession offense qualifies as an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes since it could 
have been prosecuted as a felony under federal law). 
 33. Carachuri-Rosendo, 570 F.3d at 265. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 264. 
 36. Id. at 265. 
 37. See id. at 267–68. 
 38. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2584 & n.8 (2010). According to the 
Court, the fact that the noncitizen was already removed did not, however, make the case moot 
because the noncitizen may still seek cancellation of removal even if he has already been 
deported from the country. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2584. The Seventh Circuit is in agreement with the Fifth Circuit that the 
hypothetical approach applies when noncitizens have state possession convictions. Carachuri-
Rosendo, 570 F.3d at 267 n.5 (citing to various Seventh Circuit cases). In contrast, the First, 
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have adopted the view advocated by the BIA. Id. (citing to 
various cases from the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits). The BIA argued that the INA’s 
aggravated-felony provision should be interpreted to require a noncitizen’s “status as a recidivist 
drug possessor [to] have been admitted or determined by a court or jury within the prosecution for 
the second drug crime” for the second simple-possession offense to be an aggravated felony. See 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Court unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling.40 The 
Court held that if a noncitizen has been convicted of a subsequent 
simple-possession offense that has not been enhanced due to a prior 
conviction, then he has not been convicted of a felony punishable 
under the CSA.41 If an alien has not been convicted of a felony 
punishable under the CSA, then he has not been convicted of an 
aggravated felony as defined by the INA.42 To understand the Court’s 
reasoning behind this decision, one first has to grasp the meaning of 
“aggravated felony” as applied in this case. The INA states that a 
lawful permanent alien resident may apply for a discretionary 
cancellation of removal so long as he “has not been convicted of any 
aggravated felony.”43 The INA defines “aggravated felony” by listing 
various offenses,44 one of which is “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance . . . including a drug-trafficking crime (as defined in 
section 924(c) of Title 18).”45 “Drug-trafficking crime” is defined as 
“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act 
[CSA].”46 Hence, a felony punishable under the CSA is an 
aggravated felony. 
The Court stated that for the purposes of CSA, “a felony is a 
crime for which the ‘maximum term of imprisonment authorized’ is 
‘more than one year.’”47 With the exception of possession of more 
than five grams of cocaine base or possession of flunitrazepam,48 the 
CSA punishes drug-possession crimes as misdemeanors and drug-
trafficking offenses as felonies.49 But a subsequent simple-possession 
conviction may be punished as a felony as well.50 
 
id. (citing In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 391 (B.I.A. 2007)). 
 40. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 2589. 
 42. See id. at 2581 (referring to section 1101(a)(43)(B) of the INA). 
 43. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006). 
 44. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006). 
 47. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)). 
 48. Flunitrazepam is a powerful sleep-inducing drug, which is commonly known as a 
“roofie” or a “date-rape” drug. JERROLD S. MEYER & LINDA F. QUENZER, 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: DRUGS, THE BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 371 (2005). 
 49. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 n.4 (2006). 
 50. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 (referring to this offense as “recidivist simple 
possession”). 
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The government argued that since Carachuri-Rosendo already 
had a state simple-possession conviction on his record, if he had been 
prosecuted in federal court for his second possession offense, then 
his conduct could have been punished as a federal felony under the 
CSA.51 Therefore, he would have been convicted of an aggravated 
felony.52 The Court rejected the government’s line of reasoning for 
the following reasons: (1) the government’s argument ignored the 
INA’s text; (2) the government’s argument, if accepted, would 
interfere with independent judgment afforded to state prosecutors to 
execute their states’ laws; and (3) the government’s and the Fifth 
Circuit’s positions were based on a misreading of the Court’s 
decision in Lopez v. Gonzales.53 Additionally, (4) the government’s 
argument was inconsistent with the common sentencing practices 
found in federal courts because it is unlikely that Carachuri-
Rosendo’s subsequent possession would have been punished as a 
felony in federal court.54 Finally, (5) “ambiguities in criminal statutes 
referenced in immigration laws should be construed in the 
noncitizen’s favor.”55 
First, according to the Court, the most important reason for its 
ruling against the government was that the government’s argument 
ignored the INA’s text.56 The INA states that the noncitizen is 
precluded from applying for a discretionary cancellation of removal 
if he has been convicted of an aggravated felony.57 In this case, 
aggravated felony is a drug-trafficking crime, which is defined as a 
felony punishable under the CSA. Hence, what punishment the 
noncitizen could have received or what he could have been charged 
with is not pertinent; instead, what is pertinent is the offense for 
which the noncitizen was actually convicted. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence, “conviction” 
means a “formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by the 
court.”58 Texas law authorized the prosecutor to charge Carachuri-
 
 51. Id. at 2582–83. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2586–88 (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)). 
 54. Id. at 2589. 
 55. Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)). 
 56. Id. at 2586. 
 57. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 58. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2590 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
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Rosendo as a recidivist—recidivist simple possession is punishable 
as a felony under the CSA.59 The state prosecutor chose not to charge 
Carachuri-Rosendo as a recidivist, however, and as a result, 
Carachuri-Rosendo was convicted only of the crime of knowingly 
possessing a controlled substance without a valid prescription.60 
Whether Carachuri-Rosendo was eligible to apply for relief from 
removal depended on whether his state conviction amounted to an 
aggravated felony for immigration law purposes. In Lopez, the Court 
held that in order for a state offense to qualify as an aggravated 
felony, the offense must include elements of a crime punishable as a 
felony under the CSA.61 As previously mentioned, the CSA punishes 
simple possession of a controlled substance as a misdemeanor with 
two exceptions that are punished as felonies:62 (1) the defendant was 
convicted of simple possession of cocaine base or flunitrazepam63 
and (2) the defendant was convicted as a recidivist, which requires a 
finding of prior drug conviction by a judge. Carachuri-Rosendo was 
convicted of an offense that did not involve possession of cocaine 
base or flunitrazepam and his conviction did not include a finding of 
prior drug conviction; hence, the offense he was convicted of did not 
correspond to a felony punishable under the CSA. Therefore, 
Carachuri-Rosendo had not been convicted of an aggravated felony 
according to the Court.64 
The Court briefly discussed its other reasons for rejecting the 
government’s argument. The second reason was that federal law, and 
many state criminal codes including Texas’s, allows prosecutors to 
exercise discretion when deciding whether to pursue a sentence 
enhancement based on the existence of a prior conviction.65 In this 
case, the Texas prosecutor did not seek such an enhancement.66 If the 
Court were to side with the government, it would be essentially 
permitting an IJ to apply a recidivist enhancement after a prosecutor 
 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A)). 
 59. Id. at 2581, 2583 (majority opinion). 
 60. Id. at 2591 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 61. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 57 (2006). 
 62. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2586–87. 
 65. Id. at 2588. 
 66. Id. 
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specifically decided not to, thereby allowing an IJ to overrule a 
prosecutor’s independent judgment.67 Given that a judge cannot order 
a prosecutor to charge a defendant with a specific crime,68 an IJ 
should also not be allowed to apply his own recidivist enhancement 
post-conviction after a prosecutor has chosen not to.69 
The third reason for overturning the Fifth Circuit’s decision and 
rejecting the government’s argument was that both were based on a 
misreading of the holding in Lopez. The Lopez decision requires the 
government and the courts to look at the conduct that was actually 
punished by state law—not at the conduct that could have been but 
nevertheless did not serve as the basis for the state conviction—in 
order to determine if the conduct is punishable as a felony under 
federal law.70 According to the Court, this misreading of the case 
added too much uncertainty and speculation to a “more focused, 
categorical inquiry” prescribed by the Lopez because it allowed an IJ 
to look at facts that were not at issue in the crime of conviction to 
determine whether the noncitizen could have been charged with a 
federal felony.71 
The fourth reason the Court gave was that, contrary to what the 
government had argued, had Carachuri-Rosendo been prosecuted in 
federal court, it was highly unlikely that his conduct would have 
been punished as a felony given that the controlled substance at issue 
was a single Xanax pill.72 The U.S. Sentencing Commission found 
that in 2000, only 6.9 percent of offenders with prior felony drug 
convictions were tried as recidivists.73 Logically, the number of 
offenders with prior misdemeanor convictions prosecuted as 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–83 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that 
federal courts do not have the power to interfere with the discretionary decisions of prosecuting 
authorities regarding whether to prosecute a person). 
 69. This is so given that the United States Attorney’s Manual considers the decision to seek 
recidivism enhancement on par with filing the initial criminal charge against the defendant. 
Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2588 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.300(B) (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.300 (“Every prosecutor should regard the 
filing of an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 . . . as equivalent to the filing of charges.”)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2589. 
 73. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Carachuri-
Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (No. 09-60) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. 
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recidivists in federal court must be even lower. Hence, the 
government’s position that Carachuri-Rosendo would have been 
prosecuted as a recidivist and convicted of a federal felony—had he 
been tried in federal court—was unsound.74 
Finally, the Court stated that “ambiguities in criminal statutes 
referenced in immigration laws should be construed in the 
noncitizen’s favor.”75 In this case, according to the Court, the critical 
language indeed appears in a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(2),76 which states that a drug-trafficking crime includes any 
felony punishable by the CSA.77 Therefore, any ambiguity in the 
statute needs to be construed in the appellant’s favor. 
IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Before the 1980s, the government’s use of criminal convictions 
as a means of deporting noncitizens was fairly limited.78 But 
beginning in the late 1980s, a concern over noncitizen criminals 
spread like wildfire among the American public resulting in 
hyperactive congressional activity on the matter.79 In 1988, Congress 
added a new INA provision, which provided that an aggravated-
felony conviction is an additional ground for deportation.80 Initially, 
the aggravated-felony provision included only three types of crimes: 
murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking.81 But, the list of 
crimes encompassed by the provision has grown continuously with 
each major immigration law Congress has enacted since 1988.82 
In criminal law, “aggravated felony” refers to a serious offense, 
punished as a felony, that some appalling or serious circumstances 
makes worse—usually in the way the offense was committed.83 
 
 74. According to the Supreme Court, the government did not provide any data that showed 
that even one Assistant U.S. Attorney has ever attempted to prosecute an analogous federal 
defendant as a felon. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2589. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006). 
 78. Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New 
Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 622–23 (2003). 
 79. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5, at 550. 
 80. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342–44, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–
71; Liem, supra note 6, at 1076. 
 81. Miller, supra note 78, at 633. 
 82. Id. at 633–34. 
 83. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010) (quoting Black’s Law 
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When it comes to immigration law, however, “aggravated felony” is 
a term of art and can refer to an offense that is neither “aggravated” 
nor even a “felony.”84 Even so, the consequences of an aggravated-
felony conviction for immigration-law purposes are quite severe for 
the noncitizen. Without limitation, the consequences include a 
noncitizen being unable to seek most forms of discretionary relief, 
losing certain procedural safeguards, being subjected to mandatory 
detention from the time the removal proceeding begins until the 
actual removal occurs, and being permanently barred from returning 
to the United States unless he first obtains permission from the 
secretary of Homeland Security.85 
In defining offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies, 
Congress uses language that is often broad and ambiguous.86 This has 
led to confusion and nonuniformity among the lower courts 
regarding how to interpret and apply the aggravated-felony 
provisions.87 In 2006 the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the 
aggravated-felony provision at issue in Carachuri-Rosendo in Lopez. 
As previously mentioned, that particular provision of the INA states 
that a drug-trafficking crime is an aggravated felony and defines 
“drug trafficking” as a “felony punishable under the Controlled 
Substance Act.”88 The issue in Lopez was whether conduct punished 
as a felony under state law but punished as a misdemeanor under the 
CSA qualified as an aggravated felony for INA purposes.89 The 
 
Dictionary’s definition of “aggravated” as a crime “made worse or more serious by circumstances 
such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime”). 
 84. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5, at 575; Vargas-Padilla, supra note 25, at 27. 
For example, Immigration and Naturalization Act § 101(a)(43)(A) states that sexual abuse of a 
minor is an aggravated-felony. This aggravated-felony provision encompasses convictions for 
statutory rape. Vargas-Padilla, supra note 25, at 28. In California, one form of statutory rape is 
punished as a misdemeanor. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a)–(b) (West 2008). If an offense is 
punished as a misdemeanor in California it means the maximum term of imprisonment is six 
months. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 2008). Hence, a noncitizen convicted of statutory rape in 
California, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, can be deemed convicted 
of an aggravated-felony even though federal law defines a felony as a crime for which the 
maximum term of imprisonment is more than one year. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 
2581. An offense can therefore be an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes even if that 
offense is not technically a felony. See also United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153–54 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (holding that certain misdemeanors can qualify as aggravated felonies). 
 85. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5, at 575. 
 86. Liem, supra note 6, at 1081–82. 
 87. Id. at 1081–84. 
 88. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
 89. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006). 
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government argued that the definition of “drug-trafficking crime” 
requires that the offense be punishable under the CSA and not that it 
be punishable as a federal felony.90 Furthermore, a prior conviction in 
state court satisfies the felony element because the state treats 
possession as a felony.91 Thus, according to the government’s 
argument, if a person is convicted in state court for marijuana 
possession and that particular state punishes marijuana possession as 
a felony, then the person has been convicted of an aggravated felony, 
even though the CSA punishes that same offense as a misdemeanor. 
The Court rejected the government’s argument and held that for 
a state offense to constitute both an aggravated-felony and a felony 
punishable under the CSA, the state offense must proscribe conduct 
that is punishable as a felony under federal law.92 In other words, 
only if the elements of the state offense include the elements of a 
felony offense punishable under the CSA is the state offense an 
aggravated felony.93 
The rationale behind the decision was that, if the government’s 
argument prevailed, the law regarding the removal of noncitizens 
would depend on varying state criminal classifications that may be 
contrary to congressional intent.94 For example, simple possession of 
marijuana is a misdemeanor under the CSA;95 Congress did not 
intend, however, for the simple possession of marijuana to constitute 
a removable offense. This is evidenced by the INA’s text, which 
provides that possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana does not 
constitute grounds for removal.96 But if the Court accepted the 
government’s argument and “if a state classifies possession of less 
than thirty grams of marijuana as a felony”—as four states do—then 
a person convicted of such a crime would be subject to mandatory 
removal under the INA’s aggravated-felony provision.97 This not 
only impedes Congress’s intent but also treats noncitizens unequally: 
 
 90. Id. at 53. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 60. 
 93. Id. at 57. 
 94. Id. at 58. 
 95. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2581 (2010). 
 96. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 59. 
 97. Emily Musser, Developments in the Judicial Branch: The Recent Decision: Lopez v. 
Gonzales, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 329, 331 (2007). 
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noncitizens convicted in a state that classifies marijuana possession 
as a felony would be subject to harsher immigration penalties than 
those convicted in states lacking similar penalties.98 This result would 
be unfair because being deemed an aggravated felon for 
immigration-law purposes results not only in the person being 
banned from the state in which he was convicted but also in the 
person’s permanent banishment from the entire country.99 The 
criteria and the process for admission for permanent residence to the 
United States do not vary depending on the state in which the 
immigrant is planning to live.100 Likewise a noncitizen’s permanent 
removal from the country should not depend arbitrarily on the state’s 
classification of a crime for which the noncitizen was convicted. 
Instead of clarifying the aggravated-felony provision relating to 
drug-trafficking crimes, the Court’s decision in Lopez led to further 
confusion and inconsistent results among the circuits.101 The Court 
attempted to address this issue in Carachuri-Rosendo. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court held that a noncitizen who has 
been convicted of a simple-possession offense that has not been 
enhanced based on a prior conviction has not been convicted of a 
felony punishable under the CSA.102 In turn, this means that the 
noncitizen has not been convicted of a drug-trafficking aggravated 
felony under the INA.103 The Court’s decision, however, implied that 
had the noncitizen been convicted as a recidivist in state court, then 
the conviction might constitute an aggravated felony, barring the 
noncitizen from seeking any discretionary forms of relief.104 While 
the decision did resolve the circuit split, the Court left important 
questions unanswered. 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5, at 575. 
 100. See generally id. at chs. 3, 6 (outlining the various admission categories and the 
admission process for immigrants seeking permanent residence). 
 101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (highlighting disparity between First, Second, 
Third, and Sixth Circuits). 
 102. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010). 
 103. See id. at 2581. 
 104. See id. 
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A.  Questions Left Unanswered by the Court’s Decision 
The first question that the Court left unanswered was whether a 
finding of recidivism in the noncitizen’s conviction record is 
sufficient in and of itself to deem the noncitizen convicted of a 
felony punishable under the CSA. As previously mentioned, under 
the CSA a recidivist simple-possession offense may be punished as a 
federal felony; before that can occur, however, a prosecutor must 
allege the existence of a prior simple-possession conviction before 
the beginning of trial or before a guilty plea is entered.105 
Furthermore, the defendant must be afforded notice and an 
opportunity to challenge the validity of the prior conviction that was 
used as the basis for the recidivist finding.106 
The Court held that Carachuri-Rosendo had not been convicted 
as a recidivist because his conviction record did not include a finding 
of a prior drug conviction.107 Carachuri-Rosendo argued that even if 
his record of conviction contained a finding of a prior drug 
conviction, this alone would not be sufficient for him to be deemed 
convicted of a felony punishable under the CSA; what is also 
required is a charge of recidivism and an opportunity to defend 
against such a charge.108 
The BIA’s decision reflected a similar sentiment, stating that the 
CSA procedures are safeguards meant to protect the rights of the 
accused and that these safeguards are necessary to the recidivist 
offense.109 The Court acknowledged that these procedural 
requirements “have great practical significance with respect to the 
conviction itself and are integral to the structure and design of our 
drug laws.”110 Yet, the Court declined to further address this because 
it was not necessary to resolve the issue of the case since Carachuri-
Rosendo had not been convicted as a recidivist.111 
Hence, an unanswered question is whether a finding of 
recidivism in the noncitizen’s conviction record is sufficient in and 
of itself to deem the noncitizen convicted of a felony punishable 
 
 105. Id. at 2581–82. 
 106. Id. at 2582. 
 107. Id. at 2586–87. 
 108. Id. at 2586. 
 109. Id. at 2583–84. 
 110. Id. at 2588. 
 111. Id. at 2586. 
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under the CSA or if additional procedures are also necessary. 
Another lingering question is if additional procedures are necessary, 
do the procedures granted by the state have to be the same as (or 
substantially similar to) the ones mandated by federal law, or will 
any procedures deemed to protect the accused’s rights suffice? If the 
lower courts disagree on how to answer these lingering questions, 
this will likely lead to another circuit split and nonuniformity in the 
application of this particular provision of immigration law 
throughout the country. 
B.  Other Uniformity Issues 
Another factor that may add to the lack of uniformity in the 
application of this provision is the differences between the states’ 
recidivist possession laws. At least forty-five states have statutes that 
provide for separate offenses for simple possession and recidivist 
possession,112 and most of these state recidivist statutes vary greatly. 
For example, Texas authorizes a state prosecutor to seek an enhanced 
sentence if the prosecutor can show at trial that the defendant has a 
prior felony or a certain misdemeanor conviction.113 On the other 
hand, New York’s recidivism statute applies only to a defendant 
convicted of a second felony drug offense and not to a defendant 
convicted of a second misdemeanor drug offense.114 Hence, a 
noncitizen who committed two simple drug-possession crimes in 
Texas may be punished as a recidivist, treated as an aggravated felon 
in immigration court, and as a result, be subject to mandatory 
removal. On the other hand, in New York a noncitizen who 
committed similar possession offenses will not be convicted as a 
recidivist, will not be treated as an aggravated felon in immigration 
court, and as a result, will be free to apply for discretionary removal 
relief. 
The law in California presents another example of potential 
nonuniformity that may arise. Before January 1, 2011, California 
treated possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana as a 
misdemeanor,115 and the law allowed a sentencing enhancement for a 
 
 112. Amicus Brief, supra note 73, at 12. 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.70(3) (McKinney 2010). New York treats simple possession 
of a controlled substance as a misdemeanor. Id. § 220.03. 
 115. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2010). 
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defendant who had “two separate convictions for nonviolent drug 
possession offenses.”116 Therefore, a defendant who committed a 
subsequent offense of possessing 28.5 grams or less of marijuana 
could have been convicted as a recidivist. However, on January 1, 
2011, a bill decriminalizing possession of one ounce (28.35 grams) 
or less of marijuana went into effect.117 Simple marijuana possession 
is no longer a misdemeanor but an infraction—on par with receiving 
a traffic ticket.118 It is not yet clear how subsequent possession of 
marijuana will be treated or if California’s sentencing-enhancement 
statute will even apply to such infractions. However, if all 
subsequent possession violations are also treated as infractions and if 
the sentencing-enhancement statute does not apply to these 
infractions, this will result in more nonuniformity in the application 
of the drug-trafficking-crime aggravated-felony provision. 
Numerous other states, such as Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and 
Massachusetts, authorize or mandate sentence enhancement for a 
defendant convicted of subsequent simple marijuana possession.119 
Hence, in California if subsequent possession of marijuana is treated 
as another infraction and not subject to any sentence enhancement, a 
noncitizen found guilty of subsequent possession of an ounce or less 
of marijuana will not be convicted of an aggravated felony for the 
purposes of immigration law. On the other hand, a noncitizen in 
numerous other states can be charged and convicted as a recidivist 
and thus be convicted of an aggravated felony. These types of 
situations raise the same concerns Justice Ginsburg expressed at oral 
argument in Lopez, when she noted the “disuniformity” of precluding 
one person from ever coming back while not precluding another 
simply “because of the happenstance of the State in which they were 
convicted.”120 
C.  The Case’s Impact 
Although technically Carachuri-Rosendo won, the holding’s 
 
 116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(5) (West 2010). 
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impact is fairly limited. This holding does not necessarily mean that 
Carachuri-Rosendo will get to return to the United States; what it 
does mean is that he and others similarly situated will get to apply 
for discretionary cancellations of removal.121 The decision as to 
whether the removal should be cancelled rests entirely on the 
attorney general’s discretion.122 Hence, it is unlikely that Carachuri-
Rosendo will significantly impact the number of noncitizens 
deported each year. Even so, besides precluding the noncitizen from 
applying for a discretionary form of relief from a removal order, a 
finding that the noncitizen committed an aggravated felony subjects 
the noncitizen to various other harsh consequences. As mentioned, 
the noncitizen who is deemed an aggravated felon cannot apply for 
asylum and is subject to mandatory detention from the time the 
proceedings have begun until the noncitizen is removed.123 Hence, it 
is not only logical but also just to require that a legal permanent 
resident be actually convicted of an aggravated felony before 
subjecting him to the harsh consequences that the aggravated-felony 
provision imposes. 
Treating a subsequent simple possession as an aggravated-
felony for immigration law purposes is fundamentally unfair. The 
unfairness stems from the fact that it will be incredibly difficult to 
have a uniform application of this drug-trafficking aggravated-felony 
provision across all states since recidivist statutes vary from state to 
state.124 The only way to uniformly apply this provision is to no 
longer consider the recidivist simple-possession offense as an 
aggravated felony. 
Eliminating the recidivist simple possession from the scope of 
the drug-trafficking aggravated-felony provision will not have a 
significant impact on the government’s ability to remove noncitizens 
convicted of drug-possession offenses. The INA authorizes the 
removal of a noncitizen who has been convicted of violating any law 
relating to a controlled substance unless the noncitizen was convicted 
of a single offense of possessing thirty grams or less of marijuana.125 
Hence, most noncitizens can be removed before they even get a 
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chance to be convicted of a subsequent simple possession. 
If recidivist simple possession is no longer considered an 
aggravated felony then a noncitizen convicted as a recidivist could 
apply for discretionary cancellation of removal.126 However, just 
because a noncitizen is eligible to apply for cancellation of removal 
does not mean the attorney general will grant cancellation.127 Besides 
having to meet all of the statutory requirements, the noncitizen has to 
show that he deserves favorable exercise of discretion.128 One of the 
adverse factors the attorney general considers in deciding whether to 
exercise discretion is whether the noncitizen has a criminal record 
and, if so, “its nature, recency, and seriousness.”129 Therefore, 
although a noncitizen convicted as a recidivist could apply for 
cancellation of removal, there is a good chance that cancellation will 
not be granted, other than in the most compelling of cases. Given all 
this, eliminating recidivist simple possession from the scope of the 
drug-trafficking aggravated-felony provision would ensure a more 
uniform application of this provision without impeding the 
government’s ability to deport those convicted of drug-related 
criminal offenses. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo will not likely affect 
the number of legal permanent residents deported on criminal 
grounds each year. Furthermore, even though this decision resolved 
the circuit split, it failed to address important questions. This will 
likely result in continued nonuniform application of the drug-
trafficking aggravated-felony provision. However, even with all of 
its shortcomings, the decision is significant because it prevents the 
federal government from imposing the aggravated-felony provision’s 
harsh consequences on legal permanent residents convicted of only 
simple drug-possession offenses. 
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